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Tired of Talking: A Call for Clear Strategies for
Legal Education Reform:
Moving Beyond the Discussion of Good Ideas to
the Real Transformation of Law Schools

Sara K. Rankin
Legal education reform efforts have persisted for over one hundred
years, supported by substantive expertise, empirical data, cutting-edge
curricula, and effective pedagogy. But today, the normative face of legal
education remains essentially unchanged. If the substance behind legal
education reform is valid, then what is the problem?
This article examines the stasis of legal education through the lens of
historical reform efforts, political science, and contemporary
organizational change theory. The author argues that legal education
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reform efforts are marginalized and have limited normative impact because
reformers underestimate the strategic demands of systemic change. As a
result, reformers have yet to build a coherent, collective strategy for the
transformation of legal education. The author contends that reformers must
shift from an exclusive focus on the substance of legal education reform to
adopt a new focus on strategy. Finally, the author offers some starting
points on how to begin a new strategic discussion on the transformation of
legal education.

I. INTRODUCTION
School reformers often reinvent the wheel with little or no
knowledge that many of their practices have rich historical
precedents.1
[H]istory could provide direct solutions of sorts to present-day
problems. At the least, it could keep us from repeating old
mistakes.2
The law is a creature of language.3 Legislators debate definitions and
codify specific terms into law; lawyers search for nuances in statutes and
contracts; judges construe precedential language and write new opinions
that may be binding on future disputes. While most other professions are

1

SCHOOLS OF TOMORROW, SCHOOLS OF TODAY: WHAT HAPPENED TO PROGRESSIVE
EDUCATION (HISTORY OF SCHOOLS AND SCHOOLING V. 8) xvi (Susan F. Semel & Alan
R. Sadovnik eds., 1999) [hereinafter SCHOOLS OF TOMORROW].
2
HERBERT M. KLIEBARD, THE STRUGGLE FOR THE AMERICAN CURRICULUM, 1893–
1958, at 272 (3d ed. 2004).
3
For further reading on the connection between law and language, consult LAWRENCE
M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES (1993) (survey of the impact of linguistics on
judicial decision-making); PETER M. TIERSMA, LEGAL LANGUAGE (1999) (descriptive
history of the development of legal language); STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW’S QUANDARY
(2007) (pointing out the disconnect between context, legal language, and legal
reasoning).
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defined by products or services, the legal profession is uniquely defined by
definition: the law is obsessed with words and their specific meaning.
And yet, when it comes to legal pedagogy—how law students are taught
to read, write, and communicate like a lawyer—law schools operate in a
sort of rhetorical fog. Faculty can skillfully debate the specific meaning of a
legal term or write lengthy analyses of a single case; but for most faculty, it
remains a challenge to have a substantive discussion4 about transforming
legal education. How do students learn? What should they learn? What are
the best means to assess student progress? What are the implications for
how we teach law? What are the implications for evaluating law faculty and
law schools? For many law school faculty and administrators, these
questions simply raise more questions. And so the rhetorical fog descends,
ensuring stasis.
The collective inability to define and refine effective legal pedagogy
continues to impact the legal profession. A 2007 Carnegie Foundation
Report underscored this failing when it announced that graduating lawyers
are not practice-ready, that the legal community has become divorced from
the communities it serves as the social and human dimension of the legal
profession atrophies, and that this crisis affects us not only as individuals,
but also as a larger society.5 The Carnegie Report’s sobering diagnosis

4
Substantive discussion is distinct from rhetoric. See infra Part IV(A)(2). See also
MICHAEL FULLAN, THE NEW MEANING OF EDUCATIONAL CHANGE 354 (4th ed. 2007)
[hereinafter FULLAN, EDUCATIONAL CHANGE] (observing the “need to replace . . .
Pollyanna-ish rhetoric with informed action.”).
5
WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE
PROFESSION OF LAW (2007) [hereinafter CARNEGIE REPORT]; for extensive coverage of
the Carnegie Report and other contemporary critiques of legal education, see ROY
STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION AND A ROAD MAP
(1st ed. 2007) [hereinafter BEST PRACTICES]; AM. BAR ASS’N., LEGAL EDUCATION AND
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM: REPORT OF THE TASK
FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP (West 1992)
(commonly referred to as the “MacCrate Report”); AM. BAR ASS’N., SECTION ON LEGAL
EDUCATION AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
TASK FORCE ON LAWYER COMPETENCY: THE ROLE OF LAW SCHOOLS (1979)

VOLUME 10 • ISSUE 1 • 2011

13

14

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

sparked an explosion of legal scholarship, adding to a compelling case for
the need to reform legal education.
Spurred by the Carnegie Report and the increasing economic pressure to
produce “practice-ready” graduates,6 several law schools are hosting
conferences on education reform, some are adopting terms such as “studentcentered” and “active listening” into their strategic plans, and still others are
announcing more intensive reform measures.7 Various websites and blogs
are now specifically devoted to innovation in legal education.8 Not to be

(commonly referred to as the “Cramton Report”). For summaries of these critiques, see
Toni M. Fine, Reflections on U.S. Law Curricular Reform, 10 GERMAN L. J. 717, 718–28
(2009); see also John Burwell Garvey & Anne F. Zinkin, Making Law Students ClientReady: A New Model in Legal Education, 1 DUKE F. FOR L. AND SOC. CHANGE 101,
107–13 (2009).
6
See, e.g., Lauren Carasik, Renaissance or Retrenchment: Legal Education at a
Crossroads, 44 IND. L. REV. 735 (2011); Daniel Theis, Rethinking Legal Education in
Hard Times: The Recession, Practical Legal Education, and the New Job Market, 59 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 598 (2010).
7
See, e.g., Garvey & Zinkin, supra note 5 (discussing the Daniel Webster Scholar
Honors Program at Franklin Pierce Law Center); Message from the Dean: How we’re
DREXEL UNIV.,
raising
the
bar,
EARLE MACK SCH. OF LAW,
http://earlemacklaw.drexel.edu/about (last visited Dec. 14, 2011); Justin Myers, Golden
Gate University’s New 1L Curriculum, A PLACE TO DISCUSS BEST PRACTICES FOR
LEGAL EDUCATION, ALBANY L. BLOGS (Dec. 18, 2009),
http://bestpracticeslegaled.albanylawblogs.org/2009/12/18/golden-gate-universitys-new1l-curriculum; Washington and Lee School of Law Announces Dramatic Third Year
Reform, WASH. AND LEE SCH. OF LAW (Mar. 10, 2008),
http://www.law.wlu.edu/news/storydetail.asp?id=376. For a survey of other reform
efforts, see Fine, supra note 5, at 732–49.
8
See generally A PLACE TO DISCUSS BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUC., ALBANY
LAW BLOGS, http://bestpracticeslegaled.albanylawblogs.org/about/ (last visited Dec. 14,
2011) (“This site was created with two goals in mind: 1) to create a useful web-based
source of information on current reforms in legal education . . . [and] 2) to create a place
where those interested in the future of legal education can freely exchange ideas,
concerns, and opinions.”); Center for Engaged Learning in the Law (CELL), ELON UNIV.
LAW SCH., http://www.elon.edu/e-web/law/cell (last visited Mar. 26, 2011) (“This site is
intended to serve as a nexus for law teachers, students, administrators and practitioners to
share different perspectives on how learning can be improved in law schools.”); Center
for Legal Pedagogy, TEX. S. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW,
http://www.tsulaw.edu/centers/legal_pedagogy.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2011) (“[T]he
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outdone, the American Bar Association’s (ABA) law school accrediting
body, the Council of the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the
Bar, began a comprehensive review of the ABA Standards and Rules of
Procedure for the Approval of Law Schools in September of 2008.9 The
section’s Standards Review Committee has been at the center of a
maelstrom around reforms to accreditation that some predict could cause “a
sea change” in legal education.10 Other examples of contemporary reform
efforts are too numerous to survey in detail.11
Given the Carnegie Report’s dire prognosis, the revived discussion about
legal education reform is not surprising.12 What is surprising, or at the very

Center for Legal Pedagogy uses principles from the cognitive sciences about learning and
discourse theory to study, implement, and evaluate law school teaching methodologies.”).
9
The scope of the Standards Review Committee’s work is detailed at Standards Review
Committee, A.B.A.,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/committees/standards_review.html
(last visited Oct. 6, 2011). Comments on the Standards Review Committee proposals are
available on the ABA website, and also on SALT’s website at Liaison to the ABA
Council and Standards Review, SALT, http://www.saltlaw.org/contents/view/319 (last
visited Oct. 6, 2011).
10
James Rodgers, Sweeping Accreditation Review May Prompt ‘Sea Change’ in Law
School Evals, A.B.A. J. (Jun. 3, 2009),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/review_of_accreditation_standards_likely_to_br
ing_sea_change_to_how_law_sch.
11
For example, the MacCrate Report pushed clinics from the margins closer to the
mainstream of legal education. See, e.g., Russell Engler, The MacCrate Report Turns 10:
Assessing its Impact and Identifying Gaps We Should Seek to Narrow, 8 CLINICAL L.
REV. 109 (2001). Other resources, such as the AALS Sections on Teaching Methods, the
AALS New Law Teachers Conference, and the Institute for Law School Teaching
continue to impact pedagogical reform and to produce scholarship based upon sound
learning theories. For more information on these programs, see Section on Teaching
Methods, AALS,
https://memberaccess.aals.org/eweb/dynamicpage.aspx?webcode=ChpDetail&chp_cst_k
ey=7f6a02b7-e5a2-4d18-bfcd-d464ad64e42b (last visited Dec. 14, 2011); 2009
Workshops, AALS, http://www.aals.org/events_2009nltprogram.php (last visited Mar.
26, 2011); INSTITUTE FOR LAW SCHOOL TEACHING, http://lawteaching.org (last visited
Mar. 2, 2011). Despite their impact, none of these efforts constitute systemic change. See
infra notes 21–22.
12
See, e.g., Rebecca Sandefur & Jeffrey Selbin, The Clinic Effect, 16 CLINICAL L. REV.
57, 59 (2009) (“Recent critiques [of legal education] have sharpened the current focus on
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least, disappointing, is that the discussion is still mired in rhetoric13 and is
woefully short on specifics.14
This article contends that legal education reform efforts have limited
normative impact because advocates tend to adopt a myopic focus on the
substance of reform and underestimate the strategic demands of systemic
change. As a result, reformers have yet to build a coherent, collective
strategy to transform legal education. This deficit calls for a revision of
focus: to invite systemic and lasting change, advocates must move beyond
discussions of the substance of reform and adopt a new focus on strategy.
This article also examines the persistent stasis of legal education through
the lens of historical reform efforts, political science, and organizational
change theory. Part II challenges the one-dimensional construction of
reform as a change in product, content, or substance. Instead, for any
substantive change to succeed, reformers must appreciate their task as a
subversive, political, and strategic process. Part III compares contemporary
legal education reform efforts to the progressive education movement,
which began in the late nineteenth century. Part IV analyzes the reasons

legal education’s curricular deficits, and law schools have begun to respond with
individual and collective reform efforts.”); THE INFILAW SYSTEM, http://infilaw.com (last
visited Dec. 14, 2011) (a consortium of independent, community-based law schools,
including Florida Coastal School of Law, Phoenix School of Law, and Charlotte School
of Law) (“Its mission is to establish student-centered, ABA accredited law schools in
underserved markets.”).
13
See FULLAN, EDUCATIONAL CHANGE, supra note 4, at 354 (observing the “need to
replace . . . Pollyanna-ish rhetoric with informed action.”).
14
Sandefur & Selbin, supra note 12, at 59–60 (“Legal education may be at a crossroads,
but diagnoses of its inadequacies far outpace our understanding of potential solutions.”);
Andrea A. Curcio, Assessing Differently and Using Empirical Studies to See if it Makes a
Difference: Can Law Schools Do it Better?, 27 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 899, 902 (2009)
(“[T]he lack of a coherent structure and plan to teach and assess many of these practical
skills and professionalism qualities is a central critique of the recent Carnegie Report on
the Future of Legal Education and the Best Practices book.”); Ira P. Robbins, Best
Practices on “Best Practices”: Legal Education and Beyond, 16 CLINICAL L. REV. 269,
276 (2009) (criticizing Best Practices as “…suggesting mostly general, unmeasurable
platitudes . . . appear[ing] to employ [best practices] to be all things to all people.”).
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why progressive education reform efforts failed, highlighting a botched
experiment at Columbia Law School in the 1920s. This section observes
that progressive education reform failed in large part because reformers
underestimated the strategic demands of change. Part V grafts this lesson
onto contemporary reform efforts. The article concludes that in order to
transform legal education on a normative level, reformers must become
educated about the strategic and systemic challenges of effecting change;
they must define clear, shared terms for the reform, and they must organize
for collective action at the institutional, regional, and national level. The
core thesis of this article is simple: like any epic battle, the transformation
of legal education cannot be won on the basis of a righteous cause alone.

II. LEGAL EDUCATION REFORM IS ABOUT PROCESS AND POWER (AS
MUCH AS IT IS ABOUT SUBSTANCE)
A reform is a correction of abuses; a revolution is a transfer of
power.15
Efforts to reform legal education are nothing new.16 Although reformers
have been wrestling with the form of legal education for more than 140

15

Quote attributed to English statesman, Robert Bulwer-Lytton (1803–1873). SAMUEL
ARTHUR BENT, SHORT SAYINGS OF GREAT MEN WITH HISTORICAL AND EXPLANATORY
NOTES 363 (James R. Osgoode & Co. 1882).
16
See generally LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN
EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE
PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP, supra note 5 (identifying areas for reform); REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAWYER COMPETENCY: THE ROLE
OF LAW SCHOOLS, supra note 5 (identifying areas for reform); BEST PRACTICES, supra
note 5 (discussing contemporary pedagogical and curricular reform); CARNEGIE REPORT,
supra note 5 (identifying areas for reform); Fine, supra note 5 (summarizing various
reform efforts); Edward Rubin, What’s Wrong with Langdell’s Method, and What to Do
About it, 60 VAND. L. REV. 609 (2007) (reviewing the advent of the Langdellian method
and alternative views of legal education). See also infra Part IV (discussing the Columbia
reform experiment in the 1920s).
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years, it essentially remains unchanged.17 Many factors contribute to the
remarkable persistence of the traditional law school model, ranging from
apathy, to inertia, to the common resolved belief that legal pedagogy does
not need to change.18 But far more significant reasons for the stasis of legal
education are often overlooked.
One fundamental reason underlying the stasis is that reform is often
narrowly understood as an effort to change content; in terms of education
reform, this understanding translates into a myopic focus on changing
curriculum or pedagogy. But this singular focus on content ignores the most

17

See generally Sandefur & Selbin, supra note 12, at 60; see also Rubin, supra note 16,
at 612 (“We are trapped inside a pedagogical fossil, marvelously preserved from a
vanished era by the adamantine rock of a licensed monopoly.”).
18
See, e.g., CATHERINE L. CARPENTER ET AL., AM. BAR ASS’N., REPORT OF THE
OUTCOME MEASURES COMM. 61–72 (July 27, 2008), available at
http://apps.americanbar.org/legaled/committees/subcomm/Outcome%20Measures%20Fin
al%20Report.pdf; Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking Legal Education, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 595, 597 (2008); Fine, supra note 5, at 729–32; Rubin, supra note 16, at 611–14;
PAUL MAHARG, TRANSFORMING LEGAL EDUCATION 86 (2007) [hereinafter MAHARG,
LEGAL EDUCATION]; Judith Welch Wegner, Symposium 2009: A Legal Education
Prospectus: Law Schools & Emerging Frontiers, Reframing Legal Education’s “Wicked
Problems,” 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 867, 867 (2009). For more on the dynamic of change
(and the resistance to change) in the K–12 context, see DIANE RAVICH, THE DEATH AND
LIFE OF THE GREAT AMERICAN SCHOOL SYSTEM (2010); THE FOURTH WAY: THE
INSPIRING FUTURE FOR EDUCATIONAL CHANGE (Andy Hargreaves & Dennis L. Shirley
eds., 2009); TERRENCE E. DEAL & KENT D. PETERSON, SHAPING SCHOOL CULTURE:
THE HEART OF LEADERSHIP (1999); ROBERT G. OWENS & THOMAS C. VALESKY,
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR IN EDUCATION: LEADERSHIP AND SCHOOL REFORM (10th
ed. 2010); PHILLIP C. SCHLECHTY, INVENTING BETTER SCHOOLS: AN ACTION PLAN FOR
EDUCATIONAL REFORM (2001) [hereinafter SCHLECHTY, INVENTING BETTER SCHOOLS];
FULLAN, EDUCATIONAL CHANGE, supra note 4, at 47–50; W. WARNER BURKE,
ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT, A PROCESS OF LEARNING AND CHANGING 145 (2d ed.
1994) (discussing individual concerns when faced with change) [hereinafter BURKE,
ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT]. Indeed, the ABA Outcome Measure Committee’s
recommendations for reform have been met with resistance. See Katherine Mangan, Law
Schools Resist Proposal to Assess Them Based on What Students Learn, CHRON. OF
HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 10, 2010), http://chronicle.com/article/Law-Schools-ResistProposal-to/63494.
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challenging task of education reform: systemic change also requires a
subversion of power.
Schools are “norming” institutions; they express and perpetuate the status
quo.19 Dominant ideologies determine what schools teach and how they
teach it. Education, in turn, shapes the ideologies of the future.20 Reform is
an epic intervention in this cycle.
As such, efforts to reform education are “inherently subversive.”21
Reform is a struggle because it is an ideological battle, a contest to define
and assert the dominant social ideology. Reformers cannot afford to
envision their goal as simply one of content or substance. For any
substantive change to succeed, reformers must also appreciate their task as a
political process—a revolutionary undertaking. And no revolution, no
matter how valid and compelling its basis, can succeed without a tactical
plan.
To advance legal education reform, advocates must prepare a strategy—a
campaign—to ensure the acceptance and long-term viability of the reform.
Reformers must try to articulate a coherent movement and create the
necessary environment to secure a meaningful, enduring impact. Any other
result is not true reform. That is not to say there is no cause for celebration
in isolated or localized instances of success.22 But in terms of a normative

19

KLIEBARD, supra note 2, at 288.
Id. at 274–75; Rubin, supra note 16, at 649.
21
Alfie Kohn, Progressive Education: Why It’s Hard to Beat, But Also Hard to Find,
INDEP. SCHOOL (Spring 2008), http://www.alfiekohn.org/teaching/progressive.htm
[hereinafter Kohn, Progressive Education].
22
If we care about issues of access, we cannot be complacent with localized reform. See,
e.g., SCHOOLS OF TOMORROW, supra note 1, at 11 (noting that although progressive
education schools had social-reconstructionist goals, they ironically “served a primarily
affluent population.”). Moreover, marginalized reform will never impact how law schools
are evaluated on a national or comparative level. In other words, isolated reforms will
continue to be undervalued because they will be evaluated by a metric that is biased
toward traditional schooling. Education reform requires systemic change. See FULLAN,
EDUCATIONAL CHANGE, supra note 4, at xiii; BURKE, ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT,
20
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discourse, such efforts will appear piecemeal and marginalized.23 Wellintended efforts may be viewed in hindsight as a fad. For those who support
reform, this would be a tragic result.

III. LEARNING FROM THE PAST: PROGRESSIVE EDUCATION AS
PRECEDENT FOR CONTEMPORARY LEGAL EDUCATION REFORM
EFFORTS
The fate of the progressive education movement, dating back to the late
nineteenth century, illustrates the toxic combination of a singular focus on
substance and a failure to prepare for the political demands of change. The
progressive education movement is a compelling case study of such a
fatality because its theories and techniques are a primary instructional
source for the development of contemporary legal education reform.24
The discussion warrants a preface on the definition of “progressive
education.” While historians continue to debate the definition of progressive
education,25 “a common core of progressive education emerges, however
hazily.”26 These common elements are largely associated with the
influential American philosopher, John Dewey (1859–1952). Dewey’s

supra note 18, at 14; SCHLECHTY, INVENTING BETTER SCHOOLS, supra note 18, at xvii,
16.
23
CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 5, at 190 (“[E]fforts to reform legal education have
been more piecemeal than comprehensive.”).
24
Rubin, supra note 16, at 648.
25
KLIEBARD, supra note 2, at 273; SCHOOLS OF TOMORROW, supra note 1, at 11
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[Progressive education’s] many
often contradictory strands make it difficult to provide a capsule definition of progressive
education.”). Daniel T. Rodgers referred to the elusive definition of the progressive era as
“definitional wrangling.” Daniel T. Rodgers, In Search of Progressivism, REVIEWS IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 113, 114 (Stanley I. Kutler ed., 1982). Indeed, this “definitional
wrangling” illustrates a key underlying premise of this article: to succeed on a normative
level, reform efforts must establish shared definitions of key terms. See infra Part
IV(A)(2).
26
Kohn, Progressive Education, supra note 21, at 1.
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philosophy is covered in detail in numerous other works,27 including his
own.28 This article attempts to summarize some of the elements of
progressive education below, although such efforts to define progressive
education are subject to an inherent tension.29
One faces a similar challenge in locating a common phrase to describe
our contemporary legal education reform efforts. Some refer to a “legal
education renaissance,”30 while others invoke the rubric of “comprehensive
law.”31 But these phrases are not clearly defined and it is difficult to discern
their boundaries.

27

For further reading on John Dewey and progressive education, see LAWRENCE
CREMIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SCHOOL (1961); THE ESSENTIAL DEWEY:
VOLUMES 1 AND 2, (Larry Hickman & Thomas Alexander eds., 1998); KLIEBARD, supra
note 2; ALFIE KOHN, THE SCHOOLS OUR CHILDREN DESERVE: MOVING BEYOND
TRADITIONAL CLASSROOMS AND “TOUGHER STANDARDS,” (1999) [hereinafter KOHN,
THE SCHOOLS OUR CHILDREN DESERVE]; PROGRESSIVE EDUCATION FOR THE 1990S:
TRANSFORMING PRACTICE (Kathe Jervis & Carol Montag eds., 1991); SCHOOLS OF
TOMORROW, supra note 1; ROBERT B. WESTBROOK, JOHN DEWEY AND THE AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY (1991); Lynn Olson, Dewey: The Progressive Era’s Misunderstood Giant,
EDUC. WK., Apr. 1999, at 29. For detailed considerations of Deweyan theory and its
potential application to the law school context, see Rubin, supra note 16, at 646–48;
MAHARG, LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 18.
28
For a sampling of John Dewey’s own writings, see JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND
EDUCATION (1916) [hereinafter DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION]; JOHN DEWEY,
DEWEY ON EDUCATION (Martin Dworkin ed., 1959); JOHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND
EDUCATION (1938) [hereinafter DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND EDUCATION].
29
See KLIEBARD, supra note 2, at 273; SCHOOLS OF TOMORROW, supra note 1, at 11;
see also infra Part IV(A)(1) (discussing the debate about whether a coherent progressive
era can or should be defined, especially Rodgers’s and Filene’s critique).
30
John O. Sonsteng et al., A Legal Education Renaissance: A Practical Approach for the
Twenty-First Century, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 303, 437–72 (2007).
31
See Jess M. Krannich, James R. Holbrook, & Julie J. McAdams, Beyond “Thinking
Like A Lawyer” and the Traditional Legal Paradigm: Toward a Comprehensive View of
Legal Education, 86 DEN. U. L. REV. 381, 400 (2009) (internal citations omitted) (citing
Susan Daicoff, Law as Healing Profession: The Comprehensive Law Movement, 6 PEPP.
DISP. RESOL. L. J. 1, 3 (2006)) (“These common threads [of reform efforts] have led
some commentators to refer to the changes cumulatively as the comprehensive law
movement.”).
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Although progressive education shares much in common with current
reform efforts, it would be inappropriate to adopt “progressive” as a
moniker for contemporary efforts. As explained below, progressive
education reform suffered from many missteps, and the term carries its own
baggage. Thus, articulated references to historical antecedents can easily
become liabilities. Reformers must learn from the past but adapt for the
future, so any reference for contemporary reform efforts should reflect its
own unique visage. Perhaps as a not-so-subtle message of the need to
clarify the terms of reform, this article occasionally uses the acronym
“CLEAR” as shorthand for “contemporary legal education reform.”
A. Progressive Education as “CLEAR” Precedent
If one were to brainstorm key hallmarks of CLEAR, the resulting list
would read like an executive summary of the hallmarks of progressive
education from over one hundred years ago. Many of these theories are
recursive and overlapping. These hallmarks include experiential learning,
active learning, situated learning, differentiation, service learning,
transformative education, collaborative learning, and interdisciplinary
teaching.
Experiential learning. Experiential philosophies hold that all theory
derives from some concrete human experience or practice,32 so education
needs the context of practical experience to restore a sense of purpose and
the intrinsic motivation provided by a sense of purpose.33 Experiential
learning is the centerpiece of progressive education. Indeed, Dewey’s
seminal text, Experience and Education, provided the template for

32

DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION, supra note 28, at 169 (“An ounce of
experience is better than a ton of theory simply because it is only in experience that any
theory has vital and verifiable significance. . . . [A] theory apart from an experience
cannot be definitely grasped even as a theory.”).
33
Kohn, Progressive Education, supra note 21, at 2; KOHN, THE SCHOOLS OUR
CHILDREN DESERVE, supra note 27, at 132–33.
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contemporary understanding of situated learning, constructivism, and active
learning.34 In legal education, we have approximated experiential learning
to clinical teaching,35 apprenticeships,36 externships,37 class simulations, and
role-plays.
Active learning derives from constructivist theories that “knowledge is
constructed rather than absorbed.”38 As the old proverb states, “Tell me and
I forget, show me and I remember, involve me and I understand.” In
contrast to passive learning in a straight lecture format, active learning often
involves collaborative groups, student-generated classroom materials, and
student-led presentations or discussions to develop higher-order thinking
skills of analysis, synthesis, and evaluation.39 Students may be involved in
curriculum design, class strategy, and peer or self-assessments.40
Instructional emphasis is placed on students’ interaction with the

34

DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND EDUCATION, supra note 28. See also MAHARG, LEGAL
EDUCATION, supra note 18, at 2–13 (reviewing Deweyan theories); SCHOOLS OF
TOMORROW, supra note 1, at 5–9.
35
See Stephen Ellman, The Clinical Year, 53 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 877 (2008–2009).
36
CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 5, at 27–29.
37
For example, Northeastern University School of Law’s Co-op Legal Education
Program integrates “four quarters of full-time employment” into the curriculum. Cooperative Legal Education Program, NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW,
http://www.northeastern.edu/law/co-op/index.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2011).
38
KOHN, THE SCHOOLS OUR CHILDREN DESERVE, supra note 27, at 132.
Constructivism, situated learning, and other forms of social learning theories can be
traced to the work of cognitive scientists Lev Vygotsky and Jean Piaget. See, e.g., LEV
VYGOTSKY, MIND AND SOCIETY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIGHER MENTAL PROCESSES
(1978); JEAN PIAGET, THE ORIGINS OF INTELLIGENCE IN CHILDREN (1952).
39
E.g., CHARLES C. BONWELL & JAMES A. EISON, ACTIVE LEARNING: CREATING
EXCITEMENT IN THE CLASSROOM (1991) (discussing a variety of strategies to support
active learning).
40
Kohn, Progressive Education, supra note 21, at 2–3 (“Naturally, teachers will have
broadly conceived themes and objectives in mind but they don’t just design a course of
study for their students; they design it with them, and they welcome unexpected
detours.”) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, teachers must be “comfortable with
uncertainty” and be willing to “give up some control and let students take some
ownership, which requires guts as well as talent.” Id. at 5. See also SCHLECHTY,
INVENTING BETTER SCHOOLS, supra note 18, at 42–60.
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environment, reflection, and the engagement of student attitudes and values.
Educational theorists and cognitive scientists report that active learning
results in higher student motivation, satisfaction, and performance.41
Situated or “real world” learning. Situated learning techniques seek to
create an educational context that is as close as possible to the real world
environment in which the learned skills are applied.42 In other words,
education should happen in a context that reflects the messiness and
complexity of actual practice.43 The objective of situated learning is the
development of sophisticated analytical ability and judgment that cannot be
replicated in a theoretical context. 44 Situated learning is often referred to as
problem-solving or problem-based learning.45 Such experiences are “not
separated from the noise, confusion, and group interactions prevalent in real
work environments.”46 In legal education, clinical programs typically rely
on a combination of experiential, active, and situated learning.47

41

See, e.g., LINDA DARLING-HAMMOND ET AL., POWERFUL LEARNING: WHAT WE
KNOW ABOUT TEACHING FOR UNDERSTANDING (2008); Kohn, Progressive Education,
supra note 21, at 2.
42
JEAN LAVE & ETIENNE WENGER, SITUATED LEARNING: LEGITIMATE PERIPHERAL
PARTICIPATION (1991). See also CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 5, at 173 (“The
interdependence of knowledge, skill, and sense of purpose . . . is difficult to teach or
assess through the usual academic techniques, which focus on procedures and techniques
out of context. . . . Practical judgment depends on complex traditions of living, which can
only come alive through apprenticeship experiences.”).
43
CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 5, at 188 (criticizing law schools as paying “casual
attention . . . to teaching students how to use legal thinking in the complexity of actual
legal practice.”).
44
See Deborah Rhode, Legal Ethics in Legal Education, 16 CLINICAL L. REV. 43, 43, 51
(2009) (describing the role of experience and clinical education in the development of
“reflective judgment”); Rubin, supra note 16, at 639 (“[S]tudents of politics learned . . .
that the real world, and not a library, is the true laboratory of the human sciences. Legal
academics needed another seventy years or so to learn this, and they have not yet applied
those lessons to the law school curriculum.”).
45
MAHARG, LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 18, at 38–42; SCHOOLS OF TOMORROW,
supra note 1, at 8.
46
David Stein, Situated Learning in Adult Education, ERIC DIGEST NO. 195, at 2,
available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED418250.pdf (last visited Sept. 17, 2011).
47
See, e.g., Ellman, supra note 35, at 884–90.
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Interdisciplinary teaching. Interdisciplinary teaching has been
described as “an implementation of transactional realism.”48 The concept is
a sort of “curriculum integration”49 across several disciplines.50 A team of
teachers (each specializing in a different content area) might teach a single
group of students, who are then asked to correlate or draw thematic
connections. Or a single teacher might teach a unit across various
disciplines with some organizing theme. Many law schools offer an array of
interdisciplinary courses, such as law and business school combinations,
law and social science classes, and jurisprudence courses.51 Interdisciplinary
legal ethics classes are increasingly common in law schools and
universities.52 Other interdisciplinary efforts, such as Writing Across the
Curriculum,53 are also gaining popularity in legal education.
Collaborative, cooperative, or group learning. In contrast to traditional
schooling, which requires the student to operate primarily or exclusively as
an individual, collaborative learning requires students to work

48

MAHARG, LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 18, at 14. Maharg’s text is an ambitious
examination of interdisciplinarity and other progressive methods in the law school
context.
49
The phrase “curriculum integration” was coined by education scholar Dr. James A.
Beane. JAMES A. BEANE, CURRICULUM INTEGRATION: DESIGNING THE CORE OF
DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION (1997).
50
See generally INTERDISCIPLINARY CURRICULUM: DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
(Heidi Hayes Jacobs ed., 1989).
51
Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 597 (“[L]aw is inherently interdisciplinary and must
be shaped by understanding fields such as economics, philosophy, and psychology.”).
52
E.g., Center for Ethics & Public Service, UNIV. OF MIAMI SCH. OF L.,
http://www.law.miami.edu/ceps (last visited Mar. 26, 2011); Theresa Johnston,
Transforming Legal Education, STANFORD LAWYER, Fall 2008, at 14, available at
http://stanfordlawyer.law.stanford.edu/issues/75/sl75_articles.pdf (discussing reform
interest and activity at Stanford, including interdisciplinary study programs).
53
Pamela Lysaght & Cristina D. Lockwood, Writing Across the Curriculum, Theoretical
Justifications, Curricular Implications, 2 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 73
(2004).
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interdependently towards both personal and team goals.54 The learning
environment stresses an interactive dynamic among multiple learners.55
Students must learn to work as a team, enduring the various stages of group
formation and growth56 in order to work effectively. Cooperative learning
techniques appeal to the social reality of legal practice, which involves
clients, opposing counsel, teamwork, and other complex social dynamics.57
Differentiation. Differentiation involves curricular and pedagogical
adaptations for students’ different learning styles and experiences.58
Differentiation is a natural outgrowth of constructivist theories,59 which

54

Clifford S. Zimmerman, “Thinking Beyond my own Interpretation:” Reflections on
Collaborative and Cooperative Learning Theory in the Law School Curriculum, 31 ARIZ.
ST. L. J. 957, 995, 1000 (1999).
55
Id. at 1008.
56
Many contemporary articulations of group formation dynamics are attributed to Bruce
Tuckman. See Bruce Tuckman, Developmental Sequence in Small Groups, GROUP
FACILITATION, Spring 2001, available at
http://openvce.net/sites/default/files/Tuckman1965DevelopmentalSequence.pdf.
57
BEST PRACTICES, supra note 5, at 199–221 (discussing the benefits of collaborative
learning). See also MAHARG, LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 18, at 83 (internal
quotations omitted) (citing JOHN DEWEY, THE LATER WORKS, 1925–1953 (J.A.
Boydston ed., 1981)) (“[L]aw is through and through a social phenomenon; social in
origin, in purpose or end [and an] inter-activity[, . . . which] can be discussed only in
terms of the social conditions in which it arises and of what it concretely does there.”).
58
HOWARD GARDNER, INTELLIGENCE REFRAMED: MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES FOR THE
21ST CENTURY 91, 150–55 (2000). See generally Robin Boyle & Lynn Dolle, Providing
Structure to Law Students: Introducing the Programmed Learning Sequence as an
Instructional Tool, 8 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 59 (2002); Paula
Lustbader, Walk the Talk: Creating Learning Communities to Promote a Pedagogy of
Justice, 4 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 613 (2006).
59
Constructivism is a very broad conceptual framework in cognitive science and is
generally attributed to Jean Piaget, Lev Vygotsky, and Jerome Bruner. See, e.g., JEROME
BRUNER, THE PROCESS OF EDUCATION (1977); JEAN PIAGET, TO UNDERSTAND IS TO
INVENT: THE FUTURE OF EDUCATION (1973); VYGOTSKY, supra note 38. However, the
roots of constructivist theory incorporated Dewey’s philosophies, including those
articulated in Democracy and Education, published in 1916. DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND
EDUCATION, supra note 28. See also Jong Suk Kim, The Effects of a Constructivist
Teaching Approach on Student Academic Achievement, Self-Concept, and Learning
Strategies, 6 ASIA PAC. EDUC. REV. 7 (2005) (reviewing Deweyan and constructivist
theories).
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hold that the learner brings a unique background and perspective to any
learning environment, creating a unique dialectic.60 In legal education,
differentiation remains a controversial topic but has gained popularity in
contemporary reform efforts. Some educators cast differentiation as a means
to achieve “inclusive” education, reaching diverse populations and learning
styles.61
Transformative goals. Dewey believed that a primary function of school
was to prepare students for meaningful participation in society.62 Education
influences the development of our individual and collective values, ethics,
and identity.63 Therefore, progressive schools openly sought to facilitate
individual and social change through student development.64 The Carnegie
Report stressed a similar “transformative” potential for legal education.65
Transformative values are sometimes expressed in law school curricula or
institutional messaging: commitments to difference and diversity, social
justice, international law specialties, and pro bono clinics are a few
examples.66 The transformative potential of legal ethics programming—and
the impact on students’ ethical identities—is at the core of current debate.67

60

GARDNER, supra note 58, at 150–55; see also Paul Maharg, Rogers, Constructivism
and Jurisprudence: Educational Critique and the Legal Curriculum, 7 INT’L J. L. PROF.
189, 194–96 (2008). See generally Kristen Dauphinais, Valuing and Nurturing Multiple
Intelligences in Legal Education: A Paradigm Shift, 11 WASH. & LEE RACE & ETHNIC
ANC. L.J. 1 (2005).
61
See, e.g., Lustbader, supra note 58.
62
See generally DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION, supra note 28; JOHN DEWEY,
THE SCHOOL AND SOCIETY & THE CHILD AND THE CURRICULUM (2001). See also
SCHOOLS OF TOMORROW, supra note 1, at 5–7.
63
CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 5, at 28; BEST PRACTICES, supra note 5, at 51–53.
64
SCHOOLS OF TOMORROW, supra note 1, at 5–8, 367.
65
CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 5, at 138–40.
66
For more on the transformative potential of law school, see Krannich, Holbrook &
McAdams, supra note 31; Anthony Alfieri, Against Practice, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1073,
1083–86 (2009) (discussing the Carnegie Report and “pedagogical transformation”).
67
See generally Rhode, supra note 44; Michael Robertson, Providing Ethics Learning
Opportunities throughout the Legal Curriculum, 12 LEGAL ETHICS 59 (2009).
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Community service. One means of transformative education is public or
community service. Dewey envisioned an integration of the school, the
individual, and the individual’s surrounding community.68 For Dewey, the
individual’s participation in a democratic society placed civic engagement
at the core of progressive pedagogy.69 Today, community service has an
increasing role in higher education,70 including law schools.71 The rationale
for community service in legal education includes the value to society, as
well as the ethical and moral development of the student.72 In law school,
community service often entails clinical work, marrying the value of
experiential learning with the fulfillment of ethical obligations to society.
Alternative methods of assessment. Alternative student assessments
reflect the progressive philosophy that true knowledge is not amenable to
quantitative measurement; instead, the focus should be on qualitative
reflections of student understanding and experience.73 Progressive schools
resist summative, grade-based student evaluations in favor of formative,

68

SCHOOLS OF TOMORROW, supra note 1, at 5–7.
Id. at 375–76.
70
See generally ANNE COLBY ET AL., EDUCATING CITIZENS: PREPARING AMERICA’S
UNDERGRADUATES FOR LIVES OF MORAL AND CIVIC RESPONSIBILITY (1st ed. 2003).
For an interesting read on the role community service could play in faculty promotion
and tenure, see Julie Ellison & Timothy K. Eatman, Scholarship in Public: Knowledge
Creation and Tenure Policy in the Engaged University, A Resource on Promotion and
Tenure in the Arts, Humanities, and Design, in IMAGINING AMERICA: ARTISTS AND
SCHOLARS IN PUBLIC LIFE TENURE TEAM INITIATIVE ON PUBLIC SCHOLARSHIP (2008),
available at http://ase.tufts.edu/macc/documents/ScholarshipPublic.pdf.
71
Today, at least thirty-six law schools require noncredit hours of pro bono, community
service, or public service as a graduation requirement. Standing Committee on Pro Bono
and Public Service and the Center for Pro Bono, AM. BAR ASS’N. (June 24, 2011),
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/probono/lawschools/pb_programs_chart.html#gradu
ation_requirement.
72
CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 5, at 21–22, 138–39, 176–80, 183–84 (discussing the
importance of teaching and supporting the development of ethical, moral, and social
responsibility in legal education).
73
Id. at 32–33, 41–42, 194–95; HOLDING VALUES: WHAT WE MEAN BY PROGRESSIVE
EDUCATION 176–81 (Brenda S. Engel and Anne C. Martin eds., Heinman 2005); KOHN,
THE SCHOOLS OUR CHILDREN DESERVE, supra note 27, at 21, 25–40, 196–97.
69
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portfolio evaluations.74 Emphasis is placed on student self-evaluation.75
Alternative assessments also remove motivational barriers that compel
students to focus on “how well they’re doing” instead of “what they’re
doing.”76 Alternative methods of assessment can relate to student evaluation
(summative or formative),77 teacher evaluation,78 as well as the evaluation
and ranking of the educational institution itself.79 The redefinition of
outcomes and assessments is an increasingly active topic in the law school
context.80
But law schools cannot measure what they do not teach.81 Therefore, any
efforts to reform outcomes or assessment must contend with the strong
iterative relationship between current teaching methods and current

74

KOHN, THE SCHOOLS OUR CHILDREN DESERVE, supra note 27, at 191–97.
Id.
76
Id. at 28.
77
See id. at 164–66, 171–73, 182–83, 188–89; BEST PRACTICES, supra note 5, at 206.
78
CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 18.
79
See, e.g., John Valery White, The Pull of Rankings, NEVADA LAW., June 2009; Fine,
supra note 5, at 730 nn. 66–67.
80
See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text. For further reading on reforming
outcome measurements in legal education, see BEST PRACTICES, supra note 5, at 42–91;
GREGORY S. MUNRO, OUTCOMES ASSESSMENT FOR LAW SCHOOLS (2000). The
Carnegie Report renewed debate over whether current assessments adequately measure
necessary lawyering skills. CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 18; Andrea A. Curcio,
Assessing Differently and Using Empirical Studies to See if it Makes a Difference: Can
Law Schools Do It Better?, 27 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 899, 902 (2009). Fueling the debate
are considerations of student diversity and access, motivation and achievement, and the
cache attached to U.S. News and World Report rankings, as well as logistical and
financial resources. CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 18, at 62–64 (discussing potential
costs of establishing an “outcome-oriented accreditation process”); Fine, supra note 5, at
730–31 (discussing how rankings and costs have a negative effect on law school reform);
Paula Lustbader, Teach in Context: Responding to Diverse Student Voices Helps all
Students Learn, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 402, 402–04 (discussing issues of student diversity
and access).
81
Curcio, supra note 80, at 904 (“[I]n order to assess different skills, one must first teach
those skills”). See also CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 18, at 8 (“Law schools assess what
they value.”).
75
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assessment methods: the inadequacies of one perpetuate the inadequacies of
the other.82
Hence, the call for reform. Again.

IV. AVOIDING THE FATE OF PROGRESSIVE EDUCATION
One cannot understand the history of education in the United
States in the twentieth century unless one realizes that . . . John
Dewey lost.83
Each of the CLEAR reform concepts—experiential learning, active
learning, situated learning, differentiation, service learning, transformative
education, collaborative learning, and interdisciplinary teaching—has
important philosophical roots in progressive education. And yet, despite its
compelling substance, progressive education failed to make a normative,
long-term impact. Progressive education is currently marginalized and has
never been mainstream.84 This result can be attributed to another failure: the
failure to openly discuss and analyze a coherent strategy for the reform. In
other words, progressive education failed because of an almost exclusive
focus on substance, and no clear focus on strategy.
To believers in progressive education, this is a disheartening result:
something of tremendous value in extremely limited application. For
supporters of legal education reform, we must consider whether we are
nearing the same precipice.
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Curcio, supra note 80, at 933.
Ellen Condliffe Lagemann, The Plural Worlds of Educational Research, 29 HIST. OF
EDUC. Q. 185, 185 (1989).
84
Id.; SCHOOLS OF TOMORROW, supra note 1, at 20.
83
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A. Challenges in Building a CLEAR Strategy: The Columbia Law School
Experiment
[T]he more complex the reform[,] . . . the greater the problem of
clarity. In short, lack of clarity—diffuse goals and unspecified
means of implementation—represents a major problem. . . .
[T]eachers and others find that the change is simply not very clear
as to what it means in practice.85
Not only does the progressive education movement have much in
common with contemporary legal education reform, but it was also admired
by legal education reformers long ago. Indeed, today’s legal education
could look very different but for a failed attempt to facilitate progressive
education reform at Columbia Law School in the 1920s. In his book,
Transforming Legal Education, Paul Maharg refers to Dewey’s influence
on Columbia Law School as the “road not taken.”86 Columbia’s Dean,
Harlan Fiske Stone, was a legal realist dissatisfied with common law
tradition.87 Part of the problem, Stone believed, was that “[c]larity, as well
as systematization, was a problem for lawyers—what he termed a lack of
realistic understanding and of an accurate definition of many of its most
fundamental concepts.”88 Stone was attracted to disciplinary reform,
complaining that under the common law tradition legal “terms . . .
constantly fall from our lips, but always with varying and elusive
significance and application.”89 As a legal realist, Stone sought a new form
of inquiry: one that rejected the legal formalism associated with the
Langdellian case-based method of instruction and instead spotlighted the
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FULLAN, EDUCATIONAL CHANGE, supra note 4, at 71.
MAHARG, LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 18, at 77–98.
87
Id. at 80.
88
Id.
89
Id. (quoting Harlan F. Stone, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY BULLETIN OF INFORMATION,
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DEAN OF THE SCHOOL OF LAW 327 (1923)).
86
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connections between the law, social science, and human experience.90 But
disciplinary reform would require curricular and pedagogical reform too,
and Stone knew it.91
In 1922, Stone invited Dewey to teach a course on Logical and Ethical
Problems of Law at Columbia.92 Just a few months earlier, Professor
Herman Oliphant, also a legal realist, joined Columbia’s faculty.93 The
combination of these three scholars—Dewey, Stone, and Oliphant—was an
unprecedented opportunity for systemic legal education reform. 94
Maharg details how the trio shared many views on legal realism, the role
of education, and the need for education reform.95 Deweyan theory and
legal realism expressed similar political, philosophical, and social
ideologies: Dewey’s “language [was] pragmatist—[it emphasized] new
forms of enquiry, the language of progressive, evolutionary reform, the
social ameliorism and underlying optimism; [and] an insistence upon the
uncertainty of legal rules and their artificiality.”96 Legal realism generally
resonated with Dewey’s beliefs. Legal realism also emphasized a pragmatic
view of legal education and attacked “the generalist tendencies of
individualistic, socialist and organic social philosophies.”97
The political, philosophical, and social synergies between Dewey’s
theories and legal realism extended to education reform as well. When
Dewey arrived at Columbia, he was already well known for his critiques of
traditional schooling methods as artificial, fragmented, and lacking a

90

Id. at 77–83. The Langdellian case-based method of instruction was developed by
Harvard Law Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell in the waning years of the nineteenth
century.
91
Id. at 80.
92
Id. at 81.
93
Herman Oliphant of Treasury Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1939, at 25 (noting that
Oliphant joined Columbia in 1921).
94
MAHARG, LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 18, at 77–96.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 82–83.
97
Id. at 83 n.14.
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meaningful relationship with society, experience, and the real world.98 This
sentiment is echoed in Stone’s call for legal education reform:
The curriculum of the American law school is in some respects a
makeshift, the resultant of forces many of which bear little logical
relation to each other. The exigencies of the personnel of the
teaching staff, the form and scope of particular text or case books,
the constant tendency manifest in most educational enterprises to
multiply courses, the undue overlapping of courses and the failure
of any school in recent years to make a systematic revision of its
curriculum are some of the elements contributing to the failure of
law school curricula to realize to the fullest extent the needs and
tendencies of present day legal education.99
Oliphant made similar observations, stressing the social, human, and
holistic weaknesses of the traditional legal curriculum:
[T]he feeling grows that students are going out only partly
trained[,] for numerous specialized bodies of law are developing
and we have not caught up by our tantalus-like addition of new
courses. This suggests that in some of our so-called basic courses
we have not got hold of some of those things which are really basic
in the functioning of law with the result that this now hidden
matter is constantly cropping out here and there as specialized and
apparently unrelated problems. . . . It is believed that, if we are
really to get at the fundamentals, the organization of the
curriculum must be more in terms of the human relations dealt
with and less, as largely now, in terms of the logical concepts of
the conventionally trained mind.100
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See supra Part IV(A).
MAHARG, LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 18, at 78 n.3 (quoting Harlan F. Stone,
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY BULLETIN OF INFORMATION, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DEAN OF
THE SCHOOL OF LAW (1922)).
100
Id. at 88 (quoting Herman Oliphant, The Revision of the Law School Curriculum
(1923), at 6).
99
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Maharg establishes various other synergies between Stone, Oliphant, and
Dewey that sparked Columbia’s reform effort.101 But the spark never caught
flame. Instead, Oliphant and Stone devoted significant time and energy to a
reform effort that amounted to the implementation of a few temporary,
inconsistent “reformed courses.”102 Many reasons contributed to the
failure,103 but chief among these was the lack of appreciation for strategy—
both in terms of teaching methodology and the coordination of the
implementation of reform. Oliphant created careful plans to “outline the
problems and the solutions to curricular reform, grouping them as ‘whom
shall we teach, how shall we teach, and what shall we teach?’”104 But in
practice, the effort “had the effect of shifting the attention of faculty
reformers from functionalist and pragmatic methodology (how they were
going to achieve their goal) and led to a concern with empiricism (what they
would teach to achieve their goal).”105 In other words, the question of what
should be taught eclipsed the question of how these new courses should be
taught. In his exhaustive review of the Columbia experiment, Maharg notes
that “nowhere do we find at Columbia a detailed discussion of educational
method.”106 He concludes the faculty and administration needed to “give
much more thought to classroom practice and to the definition and
implementation of realist educational principles.”107 Although Stone’s
writings reveal “deep thought [about] the redesign of the curriculum,”108
they also reveal a lack of clarity about how to implement these changes.109
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Id. at 77–96.
Id. at 89.
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Id.
104
Id. at 87 (quoting Herman Oliphant, The Revision of the Law School Curriculum
(1923), at 1).
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Id. at 90.
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Id. at 89.
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Id. at 92.
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Even if one assumes complete faculty buy-in for the content of the reformed
curriculum, Maharg’s review shows the Columbia reformers did not have a
clear, shared understanding of how to translate the substantive concepts into
practice.
Legal realism was a philosophy that needed grounding in established
pedagogical theories and practice. Without a clear, shared definition of the
substantive terms of reform, and without a clear strategy and consistent
guidance for implementing these terms, Dewey’s theories were too
challenging to translate into practice. Indeed, “Dewey’s approach allowed
others to flourish by giving them the space to flesh out the Deweyan
structure; but it was a weakness for a general strategy of legal education
which is what the realist endeavor desperately needed.”110
Like many education reform efforts, Columbia’s effort stalled in large
part from a failure to ensure clear, common understanding of the terms or
strategy for reform. Today, Columbia, like the vast majority of American
law schools over the last 140 years, primarily relies upon traditional
methods of teaching law.
The Columbia experiment illustrates the consequences of
underestimating the process of transforming legal education. It exposes a
lacuna between solid theories and successful, systematic implementation: a
black hole that devours the best intentions. To avoid a similar outcome,
advocates must add a new dimension to the discussion about legal education
reform by focusing on building a coherent strategy. As explained below,
this focus requires advocates to become metacognitive about the reform
process and covers at least three ideas:
1. Consider whether current reform efforts can form the basis of a
feasible movement. Is there, or could there be, sufficient
coherence of interest among potential advocates for reform?
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Id. at 95.
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2.

3.

What opportunities exist, or could exist, for potential members
to identify each other and coalesce around a shared vision for
reform? What opportunities exist, or could exist, for recruitment
and education of members? Real change is a systemic process111
that requires deliberate organization and collective action, so
these considerations have important strategic implications.
Determine what language best defines the reform. If a critical
mass of membership can be identified, do these members share a
vocabulary? If so, what are the key terms and how are these
terms communicated? Does this shared language center around
loose abstractions or does it engage terms with common and
concrete meaning? Defining a shared language is a prerequisite
to reform.112
Articulate an action plan. What is the agenda for the reform?
Are there plans that incorporate strategies at the individual
level? The institutional level? Regional or national levels? The
scope of the action plan necessarily limits the potential scope of
implementation. Without a coherent plan for implementation,
good ideas generally stay good ideas. Action plans increase the
likelihood that good ideas evolve into actual practices; systemic
action plans increase the likelihood of realizing systemic
transformation.

1. The Challenge of Discerning a CLEAR Movement
How can one tell if CLEAR provides the basis for a movement?
Common characteristics distinguish a movement from coincidental or

111

See, e.g., BURKE, ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT, supra note 18, at 14; FULLAN,
EDUCATIONAL CHANGE, supra note 4, at xiii; SCHLECHTY, INVENTING BETTER
SCHOOLS, supra note 18, at xvii, 16.
112
See generally, FULLAN, EDUCATIONAL CHANGE, supra note 4.
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symbiotic activities.113 Generally, a movement entails: (1) a broad category
of people who share certain fundamental beliefs of reform;114 (2) sufficient
coherence115 that members can identify one another as members of an
ideological family;116 (3) deliberate, self-conscious combination and action
among members117 (4) that results in an advantage of organization, enabling
a movement to lobby and build its constituency;118 and (5) direction of this
collective effort to ensure the long-term impact of the reform.119 Illustrative
examples include the women’s suffrage movement and the civil rights
movement.120
Not every group interest or activity qualifies as a movement. Although
various individuals may come together to support a certain reform, they
may be prompted by “opportunistic” moments or “improvisation,” as
opposed to a shared, “consistent social vision or political program.”121 Peter
Filene, a twentieth century historian, refers to these collective but sporadic
or fragmented efforts as “shifting coalitions.”122
Educational policy scholar Herbert Kliebard offers vocational training as
an example of a shifting coalition.123 He notes that various reformers joined
forces to support the institution of vocational training, but that they came
together for different reasons.124 Some came because they believed in
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“preserving the dignity of work in school programs.”125 Some came because
they “despair[ed]” there was no other way to handle a new, diverse student
body than to provide “a highly differentiated curriculum.”126 Others
supported vocational training because they believed it “dissolve[d] artificial
barriers” between school and the real world.127 Although different reformers
coalesced on this one issue, they were completely opposed on other
fundamental matters of education reform.128
One can debate whether the institution of vocational training was a
success. But Dewey’s theories required a more ambitious transformation of
American education, which could only be realized by organizational
support on the scale of a movement. Instead, a lack of structure and strategy
brought progressive education to its knees.129
Historians Daniel Rodgers and Peter Filene have examined the
progressive era and reject the notion of a coherent progressive identity.
Rodgers reflects on the “Procrustean exercise of trying to stretch those who
called themselves progressives over a single ideological frame. . . . [This
exercise produces] a list of ideas so general as to be held by practically
everyone or so ambiguous, and even contradictory, as to foreclose the
possibility that members of the same movement could hold them
simultaneously.”130 Filene similarly rejects singular definitions of
progressivism as “hover[ing] between paradox and meaninglessness . . .
struggling desperately to fit [a] concept onto data that stubbornly spill over
the edges of that concept.”131 He observes that such definitional “logic [is]
elliptical, slurring over the intermediate question of whether the reformers
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themselves felt a common identity and acted as a collective body.”132 As a
result, Rodgers and Filene conclude that whatever one might call “the
progressive era” did not amount to a coherent, lasting identity.
Do contemporary legal education reform efforts resemble a “shifting
coalition” doomed to a limited or diffuse impact? Arguably, those of us who
support the transformation of legal education are too disorganized to secure
systemic progress.133 Many of us resort to innovation in the privacy of our
own classrooms and accept the institutional consequences of operating on
the fringes of academia.134 We must better educate ourselves about the
process of change and take seriously the task of deliberate combination,
organization, and strategic action. To be sure, this is no easy task. But to
have any realistic shot at strategic progress, we must also speak the same
language.
2. The Challenge of CLEAR Communication and Action
[I]f ideas are to move action, they must be made accessible to
those who will be called on to use them.135
Acting on change is an exercise in pursuing meaning.136
Clear, shared terms are necessary for the development of group identity,
goals, strategic plans, and ultimately, collective action.137 Consistent use of
specific language permits members of an ideological group to identify each
other, to communicate, and “to secure political allegiances . . . on behalf of
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a specific reform.”138 In this sense, language is branded and serves as a sort
of “ideational glue” 139 or slogan system.140
But if language is to create meaningful coherence, it needs to be defined
beyond the abstraction of slogans and catch phrases. Consider the popular
term “student-centered.” As a law professor, I use this term all the time and
I have my own conception of what “student-centered” means. It is used in a
wide range of legal education materials, journals, law school mission
statements, and publicity materials. But I have used the phrase enough to
discover that “student-centered” means such a wide range of things to
others that I have become concerned that this phrase has no concrete
definition at all.141
Like slogans, reform rhetoric often has an elusive or elastic quality.
Popular reform phrases, like “democracy,” are virtually impossible to reject
but even harder to define. Rodgers makes this observation of progressivist
terminology, tackling one popular phrase as an example: social justice.
“‘Social justice’ is a case in point—a powerful Rooseveltian slogan in 1912
which, in the absence of anyone willing to defend ‘social injustice,’ worked
its magic in large part through its half-buried innuendoes and its expansive
indistinctiveness.”142 Slippery and ephemeral, reform rhetoric sounds great,
but lack real content that can be translated into action.
A fundamental problem with reform rhetoric is that it often becomes a
distraction from action—a sort of academic narcotic. Educators talk about
change, and talking makes us feel good—like we are actually doing
something. To some extent, this is true: it is necessary to discuss goals,
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missions, and plans.143 Discussion can open the door to strategic solutions.
But unless we forge a clear bridge from discussion to action, then
discussion is not a means to a solution. To the contrary, the attempted
solution becomes the problem.144 Rhetoric instills a sense of “false clarity
[that] occurs when change is interpreted in an oversimplified way.”145 As a
result, “people think that they have changed but have only assimilated the
superficial trappings of the new practice.”146
At this point, rhetoric masquerades as progress but instead inhibits it.
Organizational change expert Michael Fullan refers to a similar
phenomenon as the “pacifier effect.”147 He describes most reform efforts as
having “a pacifier effect because they give the appearance that something
substantial is happening when it is not.”148 Rhetoric is such a pacifier,
giving the illusion of action. Even at its best, rhetoric prescribes general and
abstract goals, resulting in “nonchange.”149
Reform rhetoric is distinct from substantive discussion about reform.
Substantive discussion is based on data, information, and education; it
involves collective and sustained effort; it develops commonly understood
goals and strategies; it offers meaningful guidance on implementation and
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practice; and it provides ongoing assessment and support.150 Ultimately,
substantive discussion spurs action.151
Of course, substantive discussion is far more difficult than rhetoric. That
is why so many of us opt for rhetoric, settling for “the quick fix and . . . ad
hoc, small-scale, piecemeal innovations.”152 In the context of education
reform, this posture is not a compromise; it is a total surrender. If we
continue to pay “more lip service than mind service”153 to the
transformation of legal education, we cannot expect real change.
Advocates must critically examine the language we use for contemporary
legal education reform. We must move beyond platitudes and articulate
specific and comprehensible terms. We must define clear and replicable
strategies. At this relatively early stage in the evolution of legal education
reform, advocates should not promote elusive concepts that are neither
coherently defined by those who support them, nor comprehensible to those
who remain to be convinced. We must articulate a clear campaign for the
transformation of legal education.

V. SHIFTING THE FOCUS FROM SUBSTANCE TO STRATEGY
If we are not careful we can easily witness a series of non-events
and other superficial changes that leave the core of the problem
untouched.154
So where can legal education reform advocates start? How can we begin
to adopt a more strategic perspective for changing legal education? A
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comprehensive answer is beyond the scope of this article, but a few starting
points are suggested below.
A. Challenge Ourselves and Our Colleagues
Advocates can start with some honest self-assessment. Consider the
following questions:
 How much do I and my colleagues really understand about
current efforts to reform legal education?
 What do I/we know about the arguments for reforming legal
education?
 What are the bases for these arguments?
 What specific terms of reform have been or should be embraced
by my institution?
 Do my colleagues and my administration share a common
understanding of these terms? If not, what institutional support
exists to facilitate a common understanding?
 Is my administration committed to providing ongoing training or
education to support innovation?
 What specific pedagogical and curricular modifications can I/we
make to reflect contemporary knowledge about teaching and
learning?
 How will I/we measure progress in meeting these reform
objectives?
After reflecting on these questions, ask yourself: Do I feel like I could
facilitate a substantive discussion about the transformation of legal
education? Could many of my colleagues do so? Most of us cannot honestly
answer either question in the affirmative. To those of you who can, ask
yourself what you are doing to facilitate and maintain substantive
discussion at your law school. Whatever you are doing, do more. Advocates
must press our colleagues to consider these questions and join us in the
quest to find substantive answers.
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B. Become Educated About the Process of Change
Legal education reform promises to be a complex journey. If we educate
ourselves about the process of change, we will be better prepared to plan,
implement, and evaluate reform. A bevy of expertise in organizational
change already exists, particularly in the public education context.155 While
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law schools differ from these contexts, many principles of organizational
change theory are applicable to reform efforts in legal education. Therefore,
law schools interested in education reform should secure a means for the
administration and faculty to receive substantive (and, ideally, coordinated)
training in organizational change theory.
The unique challenges of change in the law school context call for the
development of new organizational change studies focused on legal
academia. Some legal scholars already possess experience in organizational
change theory and should redouble their focus on developing specific
primers, training programs, and other resources to assist law schools in
becoming educated about the process of change.
C. Organize at Institutional, Regional, and National Levels
Current reform efforts are piecemeal and fragmented.156 To facilitate
systemic change, we must strive to build functioning coalitions at the
institutional, regional, and national levels. This requires a shift from insular
thinking about the substance of education reform to strategic thinking about
coordinated, collective discussion and action.
There are several ways to coordinate our efforts. For example, law
schools interested in reform could appoint one or more individuals as
delegates to coordinate change efforts at institutional and national levels.157
The formal designation of delegates streamlines responsibility and creates
accountability. Current leaders in legal education reform could facilitate the
assembly of regional and national teams of delegates, who are tasked with
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creating and coordinating substantive discussion about legal education
reform. In the spirit of representation, these delegates could be responsible
not only for developing expertise in substantive and strategic considerations
for legal education reform, but also for making recommendations and
facilitating implementation of reform plans.
National organizations and associations, such as the Society for
American Law Teachers (SALT) and the American Association of Law
Schools (AALS), can also employ their resources to facilitate the collective
organization of reform efforts—from the individual to the national level.
SALT’s recent conference, “Teaching in a Transformative Era: The Law
School of the Future,” is just one example of the coordinated venues that
could advance discussion and planning around the strategic and systemic
challenges of effecting change.158

VI. CLEARING THE WAY FOR THE TRANSFORMATION OF LEGAL
EDUCATION
Armed with knowledge of the change process, and a commitment
to action, we should accept nothing less than positive results on a
massive scale—at both the individual and organizational levels.159
Education reform experts routinely identify the definition of shared goals,
commonly understood strategies, and measurable outcomes as predictors of
successful education reform.160 Despite the support of cognitive science and
learning theory, progressive education never successfully incorporated these
predictors into a coherent, collective structure or strategy. As a result,
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progressive education still lingers on the fringes of the academic world,
enjoying only occasional (but fleeting and limited) revivals. The Carnegie
Report has temporarily revived interest in many progressive theories and
practices in legal education—but so far, legal education reform efforts
exhibit the same symptoms that have quashed precedential efforts.
While some of us are trying our hand at the transformation of legal
education, ,we collectively continue to underestimate the task.161 The status
quo is a relentless adversary that enjoys almost every strategic advantage. It
will refuse to go down easily. We cannot arm ourselves simply by writing
more articles or attending more conferences. We must become more
metacognitive about the process of reform.162 We must organize, define
concrete terms, articulate clear strategies, develop and implement plans to
validate the impact of these strategies, lobby at the highest levels, and
continue to build our constituency until we prevail. The transformation of
legal education is an epic battle. We must be prepared to fight—or to lose.
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